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Abstract
The paper analyses two datasets of elite soccer players (top 1000 professionals and UEFA
Under-19 Youth League). In both, we find a Relative Age Effect (RAE) for frequency, but not
for value. That is, while there are more players born at the start of the competition year, their
transfer values are no higher, nor are they given more game time. We use Poisson regres-
sion to derive a transparent index of the discrimination present in RAE. Also, because Pois-
son is valid for small frequency counts, it supports analysis at the disaggregated levels of
country and club. From this, we conclude there are no paragon clubs or countries immune to
RAE; that is clubs and countries do not differ systematically in the RAE they experience;
also, that Poisson regression is a powerful and flexible method of analysing RAE data.
Introduction
Children born early in their school year enjoy a considerable advantage over those born later
in the school year, simply by being up to 12 months older than later-borns in the same class.
They do comparatively well in terms of academic attainment [1, 2], sport [3, 4], and in their
emotional and social life [5, 6]. Such Relative Age Effects (RAEs) tend to persist longer than
the natural ironing out of maturational advantages suggests they should. One possibility is psy-
chological: they are due to positive feedback loops that ingrain a sense of positive self-esteem
and can-do [7]. Another is organizational: there are watershed moments in life when doors are
opened to those showing early signs of talent, more obviously evident in slightly older
children.
European football club academies recruit boys often before they are 9 years old. This is a
watershed moment because by being selected, the boys are effectively inducted into an elite
environment. No effort is spared to accelerate their progress through intensive training and
inter-academy competition. This hothousing ensures that the academy boys are soon so far
ahead of their peers that turnover of personnel is minimal in subsequent years. Because foot-
ball is such a public, social, scrutinised and discussed event, it is difficult to imagine a scenario
in which talent could remain hidden for long. It follows that the RAE profile present at acad-
emy entry is likely to persist until the next watershed moment which occurs in the late teens,
culminating in professional contracts being offered to the select few. Indeed, the same RAE
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patterns are found in between successive year groups in the academy, be this in Spain (Fig 6 in
[8]); Belgium (Table 1 in [9]); or England (Table 1 in [3]).
These arguments suggest that watershed moments in childhood and youth engender nota-
ble RAE bias, which Cobley et al.’s [10] meta-analytic review confirms. In football, bias exists
at both club and national levels for youths [11, 12] respectively; and in the professional game
[13]. More worryingly, Helsen et al.’s [14] comparison of key European leagues, ten years
apart, (2000 and 2010 seasons), found RAE bias had increased overall, most notably in Bel-
gium, Denmark, England, Germany, Spain, and Sweden (see S1 Table).
Nevertheless, there is also evidence, first identified in Canadian ice hockey by Gibbs, Jarvis
and Dufur [15], but confirmed in both Spanish [11] and Australian soccer [16], that the effects
of RAE might fade as players get older, and even reverse (the "underdog hypothesis"). Simi-
larly, the clear pattern of RAE as overrepresentation is not always mirrored when measures of
earnings, skill and performance are examined. Findings about elite players have been equivo-
cal. Bryson, Gomez and Zhang [17] showed that later-borns earn more in professional ice
hockey, and Fumarco, Gibbs, Jarvis and Rossi [18] that they are also more productive. On the
other hand, Fumarco and Rossi [19] found that later-borns earn less (in soccer). More research
is needed to clarify why the oversampled early-borns do not always press home the advantage
of a privileged start, on into adulthood.
One possibility follows from soccer talent being multi-dimensional. Larkin and O’Connor
[20] identified seven attributes that a pool of highly qualified coaches considered "most impor-
tant" in their evaluation of boys (e.g., first touch, 1 v 1, striking the ball, coachability), and a fur-
ther ten that were considered "moderately important". Not only may these attributes, or any
other set of attributes [21], be weighted differently in the overall evaluation of a player (for dif-
ferent positions, by different coaches, at different ages), but also each attribute may vary in the
rate at which it advances over the course of a year’s maturation. In a parallel research stream,
this is what was found in the rates of development of classroom talents such as mathematics,
reading, and so on [22], making each susceptible to different degrees of RAE bias. Further-
more, talents and attributes vary in their receptiveness to practice. This whole multiplicity of
what really constitutes football talent may therefore provide the younger player an opportunity
to follow compensating strategies in the kinds of sub-talents they must develop in order to be
selected. This, in turn, means that the cohort-young may be qualitatively different, to some
degree, from their older team-mates. Consequently, how the course of their careers works out
may well differ between cohort-young versus cohort-old. However, the current state of RAE
research is a long way from being able to flesh out these possibilities into a coherent and con-
vincing picture.
Against this backdrop, Furley, Memmert and Weigelt [23] proposed an interesting compar-
ison between the top 100 footballers (who should bear the trace of early selection) and the top
100 billionaires (who should not), predicting RAE bias among the former, but not the latter.
Crossed with this comparison, they analysed RAE as measured by frequency versus RAE as
measured by monetary value. The authors concluded that early-born players were both more
populous and higher valued than later-born players; but there were no such differences for bil-
lionaires. However, other researchers have disputed these claims, and their grounds for reser-
vation have broader implications for RAE analysis in general, and this paper in particular.
Fumarco and Gibbs [24] noted that the billionaires were drawn from various countries and
US states, having many different definitions of the school year [25]. Thus to assume that all
ages should be measured against the calendar year is misleading. However, to facilitate interna-
tional competition, most countries do align their domestic football year with the calendar year,
though there are exceptions (e.g., England, Japan, South Korea, parts of USA), which warrant
careful consideration.
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In re-analysing the same data, Loffing [26] concluded that the positively skewed nature of
the transfer values had erroneously driven the results–the "Lionel Messi effect"–and violated
assumptions of the t-test used to compare players born in the first half versus second half of
the year. Loffing also raised some important issues regarding statistical best practice. For
instance, that grouping players into just two (biannual) categories loses meaningful informa-
tion and reduces statistical power to detect genuine effects [27, 28]. Likewise, if the expected
RAE signature is a diminishing trend of representation over the cohort year, then why does
RAE research so often ignore this information by using the Chi-squared test, which is inher-
ently directionless, and therefore not only statistically blunt, but vulnerable to non-RAE signa-
tures? Loffing argued that correlation and regression analyses would be more useful, and
research that has done so, for instance by using Spearman’s rank correlation [19, 29], is a step
in the right direction.
Developing this theme, we further improve statistical power by analysing two large interna-
tional datasets of soccer players, and by using Poisson regression for count data. There are
three main benefits. First, the Poisson estimating equations can meaningfully quantify the rela-
tive odds of a player being selected who is born on day 1 versus day 365 of the competition
year, using the Index of Discrimination, ID, [22] (for a detailed justification, see S1 Table: Rela-
tive odds of selection). Second, by focusing on RAE as skew in frequency and RAE as skew in
value (transfer value, games played), we can contribute to the underdog literature which has so
far produced mixed results. Third, by analysing at a disaggregate level, not only do we heed
Fumarco and Gibb’s [24] warning about choice of competition year, but we can test the gener-
alisability of our findings across countries and clubs. In so doing, we also hope to identify para-
gon countries or clubs: "paragon" in being less susceptible to RAE bias, and from whom others
may learn. Pep Guardiola, then manager of Barcelona and himself a product of their academy,
appeared optimistic when speaking about Barcelona’s ability to identify talent, “having the
technical eye to bypass things like age and size” [30], with the implication that they might be
such a paragon club. And if not Barcelona, might it be Ajax, or Sporting Lisbon, as two other
highly respected academies? Sadly, our data paint a different picture.
Study 1: Top 1000 professional footballers
We collected information on the 1000 most valuable footballers currently playing professional
soccer around the world from the database TransferMarkt [31] in which informed users
“crowd-source” estimates of players’ transfer value. Herm, Callen-Bracker and Kreis [32] have
shown that TransferMarkt provides an accurate reflection of real market values, including
one-club players who have never been transferred. Aggregated over the 1000 players, transfer
value totalled an estimated €11.6bn worth of talent.
What defines the competition year is a little fuzzy in this or any equivalent dataset. For
most players, the competition year they grew up in was 1st Jan. to 31st Dec., but in many Euro-
pean countries it was 1st Aug. to 31st Jul. up until the late 1990s. Many older players in our
dataset were first recruited into football academies under that premise, so a trace of that bias
may still exist in this data. Moreover, some countries continue to maintain their own idiosyn-
cratic competition years (e.g., England, Japan), while other smaller nations have unknown
structures. We therefore first analyse the data using 1st Jan.–31st Dec. as the competition year
for all players, acknowledging that any exceptions will create extraneous noise to dilute the sig-
nal of RAE bias. But for a cleaner signal, we also analyse players from the major footballing
nations that have calendar year structure. These comprise about 2/3 of the 1000 players.
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Results
RAE by frequency: Simple tests of mean values
For the sake of compatibility, all analyses and graphical displays are done on a weekly basis.
Let a player’s birth-week number (WB) denote the week in which he was born: week 1 = 1st–7th
Jan.; week 2 = 8th–14th Jan., and so on. Players born on days 365, and 366 in a leap year were
included in week 52, with the frequency deflated by 7 / 8.25. Alternative (more complicated)
methods of resolving the partial week 53 yielded almost identical results. WB can then be trans-
formed into time of birth, measuring how far through the competition year a player’s birthday
is: tB = (WB− 0.5) / 52. That is, each player’s birth was notionally located at the midpoint of the
week in which he was born (WB− 0.5). These numbers were then scaled to lie in the one year
interval (0, 1).
Table 1 shows that the top 1000 players’ mean birth-time tB = 0.445 (corresponding to
being born within week 23 of the year) was significantly lower than the null hypothesis of .50
associated with a uniform distribution across the year (p< .001); Wilcoxon’s one-sample test
confirmed this (p< .001). Thus, the top 1000 footballers currently playing were born earlier in
the competition year than expected by chance. While there is a small amount of seasonality in
birth patterns in the general population, they tend to favour late summer births, suggesting
that our results are conservative.
Next, we repeated the analysis country-by-country for the 11 nations that contributed most
players to the dataset and operated the 1st Jan. to 31st Aug. competition year. Again, each coun-
try’s birth-time distribution was found to be asymmetric and positively skewed, mean time of
birth tB < .50, with directional support in Portugal, France, and Russia, and statistically signifi-
cant differences in eight other countries (all p’s< .05 for 1-tailed tests). Aggregating across
these same nations, tB = 0.418, p< .001 by both t-test and Wilcoxon’s.
In summary, and consistent with prior research examining RAE among professional foot-
ballers, when assessed by frequency, birth-time distributions are notably asymmetric, favouring
more early-born than later-born players [14]. This message is somewhat blunted, though still
present, if all nations are analysed, erroneously assuming they all used the calendar competi-
tion year (tB = 0.445 versus tB = 0.418). But, while disaggregated analyses can be illuminating,
the mean birth-time statistic itself lacks transparency. For example, if tB = 0.351 instead of
0.461, how much more disadvantaged are later-born players in Argentina compared with
France? We now reanalyse the data with Poisson regression, which provides an answer to this
question.
RAE by frequency: Poisson regression on weekly counts
Poisson regression is a standard method for analysing low count data [33]. It explains the
frequency count of an event (y) by an explanatory variable x, using the relationship:
y = e(b0 + b1x). Here y is frequency of birth in a given week, and x is where that week is in
the competition year, as measured by tB. Over the course of a year RAE anticipates a
declining number of players born each week. Having already rejected the hypothesis that
mean time of birth tB  .50 using simpler statistical tests, this analysis would be strictly
unnecessary if our only goal were to confirm the existence of RAE. However, Poisson
regression yields an estimating equation from which we can derive the Index of Discrimi-
nation, ID [22]. In contrast to tB, ID is highly interpretable, managerially useful, and easy to
calculate from the Poisson regression equation.
A scatterplot relating birth frequency to tB is given in the left-hand panel of Fig 1. The Pois-
son regression equations, fit statistics, and IDs are presented in the last four columns of
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Table 1. RAE by frequency: Overall, and country-by-country analysis.
t-test of mean Poisson regression
Country N t B p b0 b1 R
2 ID
Argentina 62 0.351 < .001 0.9592 -1.8513 0.21 6.37
Netherlands 41 0.386 < .05 0.3701 -1.3781 0.09 3.97
Turkey 23 0.390 < .05 -0.2168 -1.3557 0.07 3.88
Belgium 31 0.405 < .05 -0.0143 -1.1154 0.06 3.05
Spain 102 0.408 < .01 1.1654 -1.0880 0.13 2.97
Italy 72 0.420 < .05 0.7775 -1.0200 0.09 2.77
Germany 67 0.428 < .05 0.6341 -0.8246 0.07 2.28
Portugal 31 0.431 -0.1486 -0.7969 0.03 2.22
Brazil 100 0.440 < .05 0.9750 -0.6884 0.07 1.99
Russia 24 0.445 -0.4788 -0.6285 0.02 1.87
France 81 0.461 0.6718 -0.5057 0.03 1.66
All countries 1000 0.445 < .001 3.2566 -0.6466 0.37 1.91
Above 11 countries 634 0.418 < .001 2.9455 -0.9810 0.45 2.67
N is the number of players appearing in the top 1000 by transfer value; tB is the mean time of birth (0 at beginning of year, 1 at end, 0.5 mid-year); Poisson estimating
equation is y = exp(b0 + b1.tB); R
2 is McFadden’s pseudo-R2; ID is the Index of Discrimination = exp(-b1); p is the statistical significance for rejecting the null hypothesis
tB  0.50. Same significance levels also found when testing null hypothesis b1 0.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0192209.t001
Fig 1. Scatterplots of RAE by frequency and value: 1000 top professional footballers. Left panel: Birth frequency by week of year (Poisson regression, best fit). Right
panel: Mean log transfer value (€m.) by week (OLS regression, best fit).
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0192209.g001
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Table 1. For the overall model using N = 1000, for instance:
Frequency ¼ eð3:2566  0:6466tBÞ ¼ e3:2566 e  0:6466tB ¼ 25:9611e  0:6466tB
The slope coefficient for tB (time of birth) was significantly different from zero (p< .001),
and the model explained 37% of the variation (McFadden’s pseudo R2). Adding the quadratic
term tB
2 did not add significantly to the model. This was found in both the Poisson count
(here) and OLS value analyses; and in both Studies 1 and 2. They have therefore not been
reported explicitly. Also, the dispersion coefficient was 1.05, indicating that the "variance
mean" condition for Poisson is met, with no need for more complicated, variance-adjusting
models such as quasi-poisson or negative binomial. Substituting into the equation values of
tB = 0 and tB = 1 for the selection cut-off dates, gives expected player frequencies of 25.96 and
13.60, respectively. Taking a ratio of these extremes, we calculated the Index of Discrimination
(ID) as 25.96 / 13.60 = 1.91. More simply, ID is just e
-b1, here e+0.6466. Similarly, ID for the top
11 calendar year nations is 2.67. Players born right at the start of their nation’s competition
year are therefore nearly three times more likely to reach the top echelons of football than play-
ers born right at the end. So the ID statistic highlights the age discrimination inherent in RAE
in a manner that is not immediately obvious from mean birth-time tB alone. Being born just
after midnight on New Year’s Eve, rather than just before can make a dramatic difference to a
player’s sporting opportunities.
To assess the generalisability of this finding, we repeated the Poisson analysis on each of the
11 top nations individually. Reassuringly, there was good agreement between both sets of anal-
yses (Poisson and t-tests), in Table 1, showing our results are not method-specific. Nonethe-
less, one advantage of Poisson regression is that the derived relative odds ratio ID makes the
disadvantage inherent in RAE so much more transparent and easily interpretable than exam-
ining tB alone.
At first glance, in Table 1 there seem to be notable differences between countries. For
instance, players born right at the start of the competition year were 6.37 times more likely to
appear among the top 1000 players than those born right at the end, if they were Argentinean;
but only 1.66 times more likely, if they were French. However, these differences are deceptive,
indeed illusory. When an interaction term of (tB x country) was added to the Poisson equation,
it did not add significantly to the simpler model (F< 1). In other words, countries’ slope coef-
ficients did not differ significantly from each other, meaning that the effect of birth week was
effectively the same across all eleven countries. Therefore, the seemingly large differences in ID
are what we would expect from the sampling distribution of the simple model (i.e., they are
random differences in birthdays), rather than systematic differences in RAE between coun-
tries. This in turn suggests that there are no paragon countries, whose practices could be exam-
ined to discover why they are less susceptible to RAE. All countries are equally as bad as each
other in this respect.
RAE by transfer value
By contrast, there was no tendency for players born earlier in the competition year to be higher
valued, which is readily apparent when comparing left and right-hand panels of Fig 1. The y-
axis of the left panel shows, for each of the 52 weeks of the year, the number of players with
birthdays falling in that week. The x-axis is the point in the year when each week occurs: i.e.,
measured by tB, lying in (0, 1). Meanwhile, the y-axis of the right panel shows the mean log
transfer value (€m.) of those players born in each of the 52 weeks.
It is clear from the scatter of points themselves, and the superimposed regression relation-
ship of best fit (in the left panel, Poisson regression to explain frequency counts per week; in
the right panel, OLS regression to explain mean value per week), that there is: (i) a downward
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trend for player frequency with birth-week over the year; but (ii) no similar trend between
players’ monetary value and birth time. To verify this finding, the analysis was replicated using
various transformations of the player value data before forming the weekly averages, including
log (as shown), reciprocal, ranked, and raw. But, the result remained unchanged (all model
Fs< 1).
In conclusion, analysis of the birth dates of the top 1000 professional football players reveals
there is a downward trend in birth-frequency over the year. Just as clearly, there is no compa-
rable trend in player value. While many more early-born rather than later-born players appear
in the dataset, these players are no more highly valued in monetary terms, and by inference, no
more skilful or talented.
Study 2: UEFA Youth League
To replicate the findings of a RAE bias by-frequency, but none by-value, we turn to an equally
large player dataset concerning the UEFA 2014–15 Youth League. All 32 clubs that competed
in the UEFA Champion’s League entered a parallel competition for their under 19 teams. Spe-
cifically, the sample comprised 1038 players whose country of origin matched that of their
club. Non-domestic players (170) were excluded because we could not be certain about the
competition year they had grown-up in [21]. The four English clubs were analysed using 1st
Sep. to 31st Aug. as the competition year. All others were analysed using 1st Jan. to 31st Dec.
There are three reasons for this study. First, we replicate the principal findings from Study 1
on a second dataset. It is especially important that researchers ensure a thorough attempt has
been made to reject any null hypothesis if they then wish to claim that they cannot, and thus
claim here that no value effect is present. Second, we can assess whether RAE bias exists
among all academies and to a similar extent, or whether some clubs have developed proce-
dures that mitigate its effects, thereby addressing Pep Guardiola’s claim about Barcelona’s
academy. Third, the dataset offers a glimpse of how RAE is likely to manifest itself in the next
generation of European footballers playing at the highest levels.
Results
RAE by frequency
Again, the overall mean time of birth tB = 0.345 was significantly lower than the null hypothe-
sis of tB = 0.50 (p< .001 using a one sample t-test), suggesting that player birth-dates did not
fall uniformly, but were highly positively skewed, favouring early-born players. A Wilcoxon
one-sample test confirmed this (p< .001). All 32 academies exhibited RAE bias (tB < 0.50),
and these differences were statistically significant in 30 (out of 32) cases, with Arsenal and
Maribor the exceptions.
To better understand the advantage to players born early in the competition year, we ran
the corresponding Poisson regressions. Results are presented in Table 2. For the pooled model,
the player frequency-by-week equation was:
Frequency ¼ eð3:8234  1:9738tBÞ ¼ e3:8234 e  1:9738tB ¼ 45:7595e  1:9738tB
with a pseudo R2 = 0.89, p< .001. Again, the dispersion coefficient was 0.96, close to 1, indicat-
ing that the "variancemean" condition for Poisson was met, with no need for more compli-
cated, variance-adjusting models. The Index of Discrimination ID = 7.20 (= 45.76 / 6.36) was
notably higher than found with the top 1000 professional footballers (1.95, or 2.67). However,
this is consistent with growing evidence which suggests that the advantages of early-birth may
fade as: (i) players get older, or (ii) players advance to higher echelons in professional sport
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[11, 15]. The decrease of ID from 7.20 at youth level to 2.67 at senior level also implies is that,
in the specific transition from youth (U19) to senior levels, those cohort-younger players who
have got as far as U19 are actually advantaged over their older contemporaries. The italicised
qualifying clauses should be particularly noted, because over the entire selection process from
young boy to man, the cohort-young are still disadvantaged.
All clubs did exhibit RAE bias to some degree. But, there were again striking differences as
to the favourability associated with being early-born in the competition year. Players born
Table 2. RAE by frequency: Overall, and club-by-club analysis.
t-test of mean Poisson Regression
Club N t B p b0 b1 p R
2 ID
Galatasaray AS 27 0.275 < .001 0.5269 -3.1170 < .001 0.287 22.58
Liverpool 30 0.283 < .001 0.5882 -2.9590 < .001 0.266 19.28
Barcelona 32 0.284 < .001 0.6511 -2.9534 < .001 0.293 19.17
Sporting Lisbon 31 0.294 < .001 0.5659 -2.7681 < .001 0.269 15.93
Chelsea 30 0.296 < .001 0.5273 -2.7486 < .001 0.278 15.62
Juventus 27 0.305 < .001 0.3737 -2.5880 < .01 0.227 13.30
Malmo FF 40 0.305 < .001 0.7663 -2.5865 < .001 0.252 13.28
Shakhtar Donestsk 37 0.308 < .001 0.6751 -2.5434 < .001 0.253 12.72
Bayer Leverkusen 35 0.313 < .001 0.5949 -2.4640 < .001 0.237 11.75
Zenit St Petersburg 27 0.315 < .001 0.3242 -2.4283 < .01 0.207 11.34
Basel 1893 25 0.323 < .001 0.2099 -2.3112 < .01 0.169 10.09
Borussia Dortmund 31 0.328 < .01 0.3994 -2.2324 < .01 0.190 9.32
Real Madrid 35 0.329 < .001 0.5158 -2.2174 < .001 0.256 9.18
Athletico Madrid 31 0.332 < .001 0.3809 -2.1764 < .01 0.167 8.81
CSKA Moskva 31 0.335 < .001 0.3624 -2.1209 < .01 0.177 8.34
Olympiacos 39 0.340 < .001 0.5686 -2.0518 < .001 0.193 7.78
Bate Borisov 27 0.340 < .01 0.2004 -2.0502 < .01 0.153 7.77
Ajax 37 0.341 < .001 0.5099 -2.0339 < .01 0.208 7.64
Porto 35 0.344 < .01 0.4393 -1.9900 < .01 0.169 7.32
RSC Anderlecht 36 0.348 < .001 0.4499 -1.9392 < .01 0.193 6.95
Schalke 04 35 0.351 < .01 0.4064 -1.8954 < .01 0.162 6.66
Manchester City 19 0.365 < .05 -0.2749 -1.6985 < .05 0.089 5.47
Paris Saint Germain 36 0.367 < .01 0.3535 -1.6695 < .01 0.141 5.31
AS Roma 31 0.369 < .01 0.1949 -1.6447 < .01 0.106 5.18
AS Monaco 29 0.371 < .05 0.1170 -1.6144 < .05 0.117 5.02
Atheletic Bilboa 40 0.372 < .01 0.4330 -1.5995 < .01 0.142 4.95
SL Benfica 29 0.380 < .05 0.0699 -1.4892 < .05 0.098 4.43
Bayern Muenchen 26 0.384 < .05 -0.0575 -1.4416 < .05 0.086 4.23
Ludogorets Razgrad 40 0.419 < .05 0.1927 -0.9912 < .05 0.045 2.69
Apoel 39 0.421 < .05 0.1536 -0.9585 < .05 0.052 2.61
NK Maribor 38 0.423 0.1212 -0.9432 0.047 2.57
Arsenal 33 0.436 -0.0927 -0.7736 0.027 2.17
All 32 clubs 1038 0.345 < .001 3.8234 -1.9738 < .001 0.894 7.20
N is the number of “domestic” players appearing in the squad; tB is the mean time of birth (0 at beginning of year, 1 at end, 0.5 mid-year); Poisson estimating equation is
y = exp(b0 + b1.tB); R
2 is McFadden’s pseudo-R2; ID is the Index of Discrimination = exp(-b1); First p is the statistical significance for rejecting the null hypothesis tB 
0.50. Second p is the statistical significance for rejecting the null hypothesis b1  0.
Asterisk () is for clubs using 1st Sep. to 31st Aug. competition year
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0192209.t002
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right at the very start of the year were nearly 20 times more likely than those born at the very
end to be recruited by academies at Galatasaray (22.58), Liverpool (19.28) and Barcelona
(19.17), but only twice as likely if selected by Arsenal (2.17), Maribor (2.57), Apoel (2.61), or
Ludogorets (2.69). Interestingly, Barcelona has one of the highest IDs, while at the same time it
is celebrated as being a paragon academy, having nurtured the talent of Xavi, Iniesta, and
Messi, in defiance of their small stature (biological maturity). Contrary to Pep Guardiola’s
assertion in our introduction, the empirical evidence would suggest that Barcelona is therefore
no paragon club when it comes to RAE bias in decisions of academy player selection.
However, these seemingly impressive inter-club differences were illusory rather than sys-
tematic, because when a club x tB interaction was added to the Poisson equation, it was non-
significant (F< 1), exactly as in the countries analysis. Thus, clubs did not differ significantly
from each other in their RAE slopes, meaning that clubs’ RAEs are best viewed as random
samples drawn from a single distribution (that of the simple Poisson model). In conclusion,
there are no paragon clubs; neither Barcelona, Ajax, Sporting Lisbon or any other. They are all
essentially as biased as each other.
Since this is such a surprising result, further research is clearly needed before we can
unequivocally conclude that there are no inter-club differences. For instance, if the degree of
per-club bias (Table 2) persists year-on-year, idiosyncratically for each club, the bias would be
systematic: if there is no relationship between each club’s level of bias year-on-year, the bias
would be random in the sense argued here from non-significant interaction terms.
RAE by value
Being at the start of their career, most players do not yet have monetary values, so we use
games played as a proxy measure. Games played can signal a player’s value in two different
ways: by being chosen above team-mates, and / or by being talented enough to play for better
teams that progress further in the competition.
Fig 2 present the scatterplots and lines of best fit using Poisson (by frequency) and OLS (by
value) regressions. As in Study 1, the value-analysis regression was not significant (F< 1),
whether player weekly averages were expressed in terms of logs (as shown), reciprocal or
ranked transformations. The flat slope of the line makes this abundantly clear (right panel).
In summary, these results match those we found with professional footballers. Figs 1 and 2
both tell much the same story: a downward trend over the cohort year for player frequency
that is not matched by any trend for value. In essence, both clubs and countries selection poli-
cies appear to favour those born early in the competition year, but early-born players are no
more skilled or talented than their later-born peers.
Discussion and conclusions
Having analysed two large football player datasets we conclude, consistent with Cobley et al.’s
[10] meta-analytic review, that there are advantages to being early-born, close to the competi-
tion year’s cut-off date, in that leading European football clubs and successful international
nations both recruit more early-born players. However, our analyses also show that early-born
players turn out to be no more talented or skilful, when measured by transfer value or games
played.
We found no real evidence for paragon countries or paragon clubs in terms of their RAE
(Relative Age Effect) profile. Indeed, Barcelona, often cited as having a paragon development
centre, had one of the largest Index of Discrimination (ID) of all. But, it is possible these ele-
vated levels are a symptom of their success. The TTG model of RAE [22] predicts that the
more elitist the selection, the greater the RAE bias. Perhaps clubs with the most RAE bias, such
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as Barcelona, are drawing on a much larger population of eligible boys, leading to more elitist
selection. However, empirical studies are few, though Schorer et al.’s [4] comparison of 49
European footballing nations found that differences in RAE were not related to depth of com-
petition, measured by population size or ratio of domestic to total players. If RAE is inevitable,
and clubs powerless to avoid it when making player selection decisions [34], then perhaps foot-
ball authorities will have to implement corrective policy.
One methodological innovation in this paper is to use Poisson regression which, despite
being the standard statistical technique to analyse low frequency count data, remains under-
used in RAE research. From it, we derive an easily interpretable measure of RAE bias, ID. Stan-
dard practice of using Chi-squared tests to show that observed quarterly or monthly
frequencies differ from a uniform distribution is limited, and can even be misleading. RAE
anticipates a decline in frequency across the year. Yet Chi-squared tests could be significant if
the relationship were a U, an inverted-U, or an increasing frequency across the year – none of
which has an RAE signature. Also, with Poisson regression, we can legitimately perform more
disaggregated analyses, and thereby build a more nuanced understanding of the RAE phenom-
ena. Finally, Poisson regression can model more than one explanatory variable in the same
analysis: for instance, to disentangle the effects of birthtime in the competition year (tB) from
background variations in the population birthrate across the year; to model time-trends in
RAE; or model mixed cohort definitions, as when school year and sports year are different; or
to model interaction terms. As an example, in this paper we were able to show that clubs and
Fig 2. Scatterplots of RAE by frequency and value: 32 clubs’ U19 academy footballers. Left panel: Birth frequency by week of year (Poisson regression best fit). Right
panel: Mean games played per player by birthweek (OLS regression best fit).
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0192209.g002
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countries are drawn from the same population pool when it comes to RAE, as we found no
(country x tB), nor (club x tB) interactions, meaning that there is no evidence that paragon
clubs or countries exist which are reliably less susceptible to RAE.
However, RAE as measured by player value tells a different story. Contrary to recent studies
by Ashworth and Heyndels [29], Fumarco, Gibbs, Jarvis and Rossi [18], and McCarthy, Collins
and Court [35], we found no evidence for a reversal of RAE; no upward trend in player value
with later birth. Later-born players did not command higher transfer values, nor in youth foot-
ball did they enjoy more playing opportunities. Nor indeed was there any evidence for an
inverted U relationship in player value over the year, as in “the educated underdog hypothesis”
[36], such that those in the middle of the year gain longer-term benefit from having to work
harder to keep up with the older boys, whereas for the youngest, the competition is just too
strong. Including a quadratic term in tB, in addition to tB itself, did not add significantly to
either of value models (professional, youth), nor the frequency models.
Like Vaeyens et al. [37], we found soccer talent was equally distributed throughout the com-
petition year. December born players were equally skilled as January born players, but due to
an accident of birth they did not get the breaks, consequently there are fewer of them at the
highest levels of football. We therefore agree with Vaeyens et al., (p. 293 in [37]) that, “children
disadvantaged by birth date or physical maturity might have become equally skilled senior ath-
letes if they were afforded equivalent developmental opportunities.” But sadly they weren’t.
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